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A bstract
This paper claims tha t the hazy in tersec tion  betw een 
the diverse fields o f theology and the o ther sciences is 
not to  be clarified in the first place by exploring m etho­
dological parallels or degrees o f consonance betw een 
theology and the sciences. W hat should be explored 
first is the epistem ological question of the nature and 
status of explanations and of explanatory claims in theo­
logy and science. The similarities, as well as im portant 
differences betw een theology and science, will thus be 
highlighted when we focus this discussion on the sha­
ping of rationality in theology and science, on the her­
m eneutical problem  o f relating  context and meaning, 
and on the fallib ilist na tu re  o f both  theo log ical and 
scientific truth claims.
1. IN TRO D U C TIO N
For those who are serious about living the Christian faith in the context of our con­
tem porary postm odern world, the task of doing theology in a way that might really 
make a difference presents itself as a daunting and even confusing challenge. D eep­
ly affected by contem porary cultural and political issues, by the successes of the 
natural sciences and technology and the pervasive presence of especially the psycho-
• Inaugural speech held on 10 February 1993 as Jam es I McCord Professor of Theology and 
Science, Princeton Theological Seminary.
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logical and social sciences in our daily lives, this challenge translates as follows: Do 
we still have good reasons to  stay convinced that the heart of the Christian message 
does indeed provide the most adequate  in terpre tation  of our experience with our 
world, our culture(s), and ourselves? Put in a different way, does the postm odern 
world, with its radical religious and cultural pluralism, its spectacular technology and 
its values that also force us to confront the realities of environm ental destruction, 
political, econom ic, racial, and sexual injustice, still ultim ately m ake sense in the 
light of Sinai and Calvary?
O ur world has, of course, been fundamentally changed by an all-pervasive scien­
tific culture that shapes the rationality of the way we live our daily lives. The advent 
of m odem  thought has in fact led to an unparalleled transform ation in the way we as 
human beings have come to regard the natural world and our relation to it. In a way 
it could even be argued that, in the history of W estern thought, the advent of scien­
tific culture outshines everything since the rise of Christianity (cf Peacocke 1990:27).
Today theologians and scientists, w hether they agree or not, and w hether they 
even talk or not, are together in their awe for the way the powers of hum an reason 
and im agination m anage to far exceed our dem ands for biological survival, and for 
the extraordinary ability of the hum an mind to represent aspects of the world that 
are inaccessible to our ordinary senses. But scientists are also teaching theologians 
something today: the baffling and puzzling incompleteness of all our attem pts at fin­
ding m eaning and intelligibility in our world. O ur knowledge of the natural world 
stretches out in two directions: to the basic constituents of physical reality on the 
one hand, and to the higher levels of biological complexity on the o ther (cf P ea­
cocke 1990:82). We should indeed be in awe in the face of the amazing and inven­
tive creativity of the world in which we have evolved: the elusive and unpicturable 
basic sub-atomic entities out of which everything is made, including ourselves, have 
potentialities unknown and undescribable in terms of the physics that discovers and 
the mathematics that symbolizes them. Therefore, at both the extremes of our com­
prehension - the sub-atom ic and the personal - we face such baffling depths that 
even scientists today speak of the mystery of the universe.
A rthur Peacocke (1990:83ff) has recently convincingly argued for the merging of 
this search for intelligibility with the search for ultim ate m eaning in life. Science 
today forces us to contem plate the future of our planet since we have to reckon with 
its certain  d isappearance. The energy o f our sun, which sustains life on earth , is 
finite: The sun is about halfway through its life and the time left for the existence of 
the earth  is about the sam e as the length of time it has already existed. Thus, the 
dem ise o f all life on earth , including our lives as hum ans, is really quite certain . 
Science today therefore forces us to ask; W hat is the meaning of this universe and of
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our presence in it? These are the uhim ate questions that bring theology and science 
closer together for they are questions that cannot be answered through the resour­
ces of science alone. Thus, the scientifically observed and understood character of 
the natural world, including our existence as hum an beings, is today of im mense 
theological im portance: for what nature is like, what the meaning of hum an life is, 
what G od is like, indeed whether or not God exists, have become questions that are 
so interlocked that they caimot be considered in isolation anymore.
For theology today, an all-im portant focus of its dialogue with our contem pora­
ry culture is therefore not only the trem endous problems that would arise if theology 
should choose to re trea t to the insular comfort of an exclusivist theological confes- 
sionalism, but also and precisely its uneasy relationship with the sciences. In fact, as 
theologians we find ourselves confronted with a special challenge: First, we have to 
try our best to keep together, in a meaningful whole, a very specific sense of conti­
nuity with the Christian tradition and a respect for religious and cultural pluralism, 
as well as a resisting of any form of political o r confessional authoritarianism  (cf 
Taylor 1990:31ff). Second, postm odern thought also challenges us to  explore again 
the p resupposed  continuity betw een C hristian  theology and the general hum an 
enterprise of understanding the world rationally.
In trying to do this, however, we soon discover that not only theology, but also 
the sciences have been profoundly influenced by our postm odern culture. This gives 
an unexpected and complicating twist to the centuries-old theology and science pro­
blem ; no t only theology, but also postm odern  science and philosophy of science 
have moved away quite dramatically from positivist and technocentric conceptions 
of scientific rationality with its closely aligned beliefs in linear progress, guaranteed 
success, determ inistic predictability, absolute truths and some uniform, standardized 
form  of knowledge. Some contem porary philosophers o f science now argue for a 
postm odern  philosophy of science which, along with fem inist in te rp re ta tio n s of 
science, focuses on trust in local scientific practice while, at the same time, all global 
interpretations of science are rejected (cf Rouse 1991). This kind of postmodernism 
in science not only sharply deconstructs and rejects the autonom y and cultural dom i­
nance of especially the natural sciences in our time, but seriously challenges any 
attem pt to develop a  meaningful and intelligible relationship betw een science and 
Christian theology today.
In certain significant ways postmodernism, with its clear-cut option for pluralism 
and diversity (cf H arvey 1989:9ff), seem s there fo re  to  leave bo th  theology and 
science fragmented. And this seems to be the perplexing challenge we have to deal 
with: Is it at all possible to meaningfully relate the fragmented, specialized world of 
contem porary science to the equally fragmented intellectual world of contemporary
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theology? In spite of its postmodern guise, the theology-and-science problem has of 
course been with the Christian church for centuries. In his im portant pubhcation, 
Creation and the history o f  science (1991), C hristopher Kaiser recently argued that 
the problem  of the G od-and-science relationship in the Judaeo-C hristian context 
goes back a t least as far as the second century BC. This essentially grew into the 
enduring question: Can Christians reconcile their faith in G od with their scientific 
work in the laboratory?
In addition to this, it is well known that theology has been fundamentally influ­
enced by both the philosophical cosmology o f the ancient world and the scientific 
discoveries o f our time. The natural sciences, however, have also been seriously 
influenced by theological presuppositions throughout its long history. From the days 
of the early church, through the revival of A ristotelian thought in the Middle Ages 
and the beginning of modern science in the Renaissance and the Enlightenm ent, up 
to post-N ew tonian m echanics in the n ineteenth century with its conclusions ulti­
mately in the theological implications of the thoughts o f the founders of tw entieth 
century physics, Niels Bohr and A lbert Einstein. From the beginning of the Chris­
tian era  to  the late eighteenth century, an operational faith in G od as C reator cer­
tainly was an essential factor in the developm ent of all branches of science. This 
created a kind of matrix in which theologians and scientists could coexist in a way 
that we can only dream  about today.
T he n ine teen th  century, with the trium ph of individualism  in relig ion and 
professionalism in science, obviously changed all that when science, under the surge 
of Darwinism, moved away from theology rather dramatically. Even in our complex 
world today, however, Christian theologians who are looking for ways to interpret 
the idea of creation meaningfully still hang on to some very basic commitments: the 
idea that nature is intelligible; that nature is relatively autonom ous; and that reality, 
as created by God, has some intrinsic unity as G od’s creation. For many in the con­
tem porary theology-and-science debate, especially with the abandonm ent very often 
of the traditional idea of a C reator God, this has become a driving force behind all 
their reflection: Even if the origin of the cosmos may ultim ately be unintelligible, 
nature itself is eminently intelligible and reflects the same rationality as the human 
mind. Human intelligence in the end seems to go hand in hand with an intelligible 
universe. M oreover, an act of faith always seems necessary for the scientist too: a 
com m itm ent to the m etaphysical belief that the world is intelligible and open to 
rational exploration (cf Polkinghorne 1991:49).
A fundam ental comm itment to this kind of intelligibility has no doubt been the 
im petus behind an intense revival of worldwide academ ic interest in the troubled 
relationship between theology and science, especially during the past decade. In the
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U nited States, such institutions as the C enter of Theology and the N atural Sciences 
in Berkeley, the Institute for Religion in an Age of Science, the Chicago C enter for 
Religion and science, and, in Princeton, the C enter of Theological Inquiry have cer­
tainly becom e leaders in the task o f nurturing the emerging discipline and various 
centers of theology and science, and also in introducing it the podiums of the A m eri­
can Academ y of Religion and the A m erican Association for the A dvancem ent of 
Science. Princeton Theological Seminary followed suit by establishing the first, and 
at this tim e, the only C hair in Theology and Science in the world. In all of these 
instances, the ground-breaking work of American and British scholars like Ian Bar­
bour, A rthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, and Thomas Torrance, is being carefully 
analyzed and built upon by a host of younger scholars in fields as diverse as philoso­
phical theology, philosophy of science, cosmology, evolutionary biology, neurobio­
logy, genetics, physics, astrophysics, quantum  physics, ecology, biochemistry, anthro­
pology, technology, and the cognitive and social sciences.
2. T H E  Q U E ST  FO R  IN T E L U G IB IU T Y
In spite of this tremendous diversity, the theology and science debate today is domi­
nated and held together by an inspiring quest for intelligibility. Most o f us would 
agree that G od transcends our final grasp, and that encounters with G od obviously 
involve deeper levels than that of the rational, enquiring mind alone. But, as many 
scientists and theologians today will acknowledge, the quest for intelligibility, or the 
search for understanding at the deepest possible level, will be incomplete if it does 
not include within itself the religious quest for ultim ate meaning, purpose, and signi­
ficance.
This mutual quest for intelligibility has not only created  exciting new areas of 
discussion betw een theology and science, but also  again  brought theology and 
science closer together. In this m utual quest for intelligibility and consonance, 
scientists, philosophers, and theologians in the field increasingly realize that both 
theology and science are responses to  the way things are: both appeal to the cohe­
rent intelligibility that each achieves through its insights. Each can be seen as an 
attem pt to understand our world of experience and in the light of this experience to 
establish possible points of contact and also possible points of conflict. In this sense 
theology and science can indeed be seen as mutually illuminating approaches to one 
and the same reality. For this reason the current debate between theology and the 
sciences converges on the understanding of the human person as a psychosomatic 
unity in both science and religion, and on the integration of evolutionary-biological 
ideas with a sense of G od as a transcendent but also an im m anent, ever-working
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C reator. R oger Trigg recently argued that it is no m ore a m iracle that the hum an 
mind can understand the world than that the hum an eye can see it; evolution in a 
sense explains both, also dem onstrates why we are so at home in the world (cf Trigg 
1989:212) and why superior intelligence corresponds with a  highly intelligible world. 
For the same reason so much of the current debate is focusing on relating the ori­
gins of our cosmos, in the light of contem porary astrophysics and cosmology, to the 
Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation. Not just questions such as “w hat is the theo­
logical significance of the Big Bang theory?’ but also the im plications of the novel 
features of quantum  physics and relativity are now part of the daily and ongoing dis­
cussion of those who are working in theology and science.
The cu rren t theology and science discussion thus very much presents itself as 
contem porary apologetics for the Christian faith, and as such it will fundamentally 
shape our expression of the Christian experience of God. It also shapes our intellec­
tual expression of the Christian faith and cautions us to greater epistemological and 
methodological sophistication. Theologians, however, will have to be careful to pro­
tect the integrity and unique character of theological reflection in this im portant dis­
cussion. And, perhaps m ore im portantly, theologians will have to be extra careful 
not to create the impression that, while science appears to be very rational and open 
to correction, theology seem s to always be ready to play the trum p card of unques­
tionable and self-authenticating revelation. Indeed, in the case of the natural scien­
ces, we are  offered  know ledge o f w hat the physical w orld might really be like: 
science here imposes conditions or constraints that theologians should respect when 
they give accounts of what is regarded as G od’s relationship with this world.
3. TH EO LO G Y , SCIENCE AND EPISTEM OLOGY
The question of how theology and science should relate to one another is, of course, 
neither a theological nor a scientific issue. It is, rather, an epistemological issue, i.e. 
an  issue about how two very d ifferen t claims to knowledge are  to be related  (cf 
McMullin 1981:26). W hat is at stake here is basically the nature of knowledge, and 
the way it presents itself in the often very divergent claims resulting from religious 
and scientific worldviews. O ur conviction that our world is highly intelligible, how­
ever, at least partly motivates us to search for some form of unified theory. There is 
no way that we could be content with a  plurality of unrelated languages if they are in 
fact languages about the same world - especially if we are seeking a coherent inter­
p re ta tio n  of all experience (cf B arbour 1990:16). In ou r a ttem p t to  in teg ra te  a 
single world-view that would incorporate both theology and science, the obvious 
question is therefore  going to  be: what is the status of scientific claims about our
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cosmos, and what sort of knowledge claims, if any, do we make in theology? If, fur­
therm ore, any form of ‘revelation’ is to be seen as the basis of religious knowledge 
claims, what kind of knowledge do we have here? W hat is more, is it at all possible
- o r even desirable - that our theological perspectives may be able to  assist us, for 
instance, in choosing betw een different scientific theories that may be m ore o r less 
compatible with biblical world-views?
The complexity o f these issues is very well illustrated when, for a m om ent, we 
briefly look at the history of the relationship betw een scientific cosmology and the 
Christian doctrine of creation. At the beginning of the early medieval period Jews, 
Christians and Moslems were agreed on at least one theological ‘given’: the universe 
had a beginning in time. This, of course, was based on the G enesis story of the crea­
tion, and A ugustine, who in principle was willing to take the road of m etaphor to 
avoid any conflict with ‘dem onstrated tru ths’, was keen to show that there was no 
conflict here: creation  was seen as a single tim eless act through which tim e itself 
came to be (cf McMullin 1981:28).
The rediscovery of Aristotle, however, first in Islam and then in the Latin West, 
introduced a new challenge to the doctrine of creation; A ristotle argued strongly 
that neither m atter nor time could have a beginning. TTiis led to a  serious confron­
tation between a ‘pagan’ cosmology and Christian theology which, as E rnan McMul­
lin (1981:29f) argues, brought about the most serious intellectual crisis the church 
had faced in alm ost a thousand years. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council attacked 
the A ristotelian position and defined it as a doctrine of faith that the universe had a 
beginning in time. Later, Aquinas would show that neither side of the debate could 
be dem onstrated philosophically. With the coming of the ‘new science’ in the seven­
teenth century, however, the terms of the debate changed when Newton’s mechanics 
appeared to  allow for a compromise position: the absolutes o f space and tim e were 
without beginning, but also without content. C reation m eant that God brought m at­
ter to be within the confines of space at a finite time in the past.
However, the numerous traces of historical developm ent on the earth ’s surface 
(eventually followed by the establishment of geology as a new science at the U niver­
sity of Cambridge in 1870), and the discovery later of the second law of therm odyna­
mics, made the Aristotelian notion of an unchanging, eternal cosmos seem  quite im­
plausible (cf McM ullin 1981:30). Even later E instein’s general theory of relativity, 
com bined with H ubble’s 1929 discovery of the galactic red-shift led to the widely 
acclaim ed postu late  of an expanding universe, or the so-called Big Bang-theory, 
according to which a singularity is postulated about 15 billion years ago from which 
the expansion of our universe began. The im portance o f the Big Bang theory is 
easily recognized: for the first time physics was led by its own resources to som e­
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thing that sounded like a beginning of time (cf D rees 1990:17ff, 21 Iff). This was fol­
lowed by theological responses that ranged from positions like that of Pope Pius XII 
who hailed the theory as unqualified support for the C hristian idea o f creation, to 
rejection because it either looked too much like creation, or conflicted with the fun­
dam entalist or literalist notion of a  creation a few thousand years ago. It is clear, 
how ever, th a t none of these positions take the com plexities o f the relationsh ip  
betw een scientific and theological epistemology into consideration at all. Not only 
can the Big Bang not automatically be assumed to be either the beginning of time or 
o f the universe, o r can it be taken  for g ran ted  th a t the lapse of tim e since the 
so-called Big Bang is necessarily the age of the universe (cf McMullin 1981:35): The 
Big Bang theory and scientific cosmology in general - as W illem D rees has recently 
pointed  out - is not in the first place about the origin of the universe, but ra ther 
about its subsequent evolution. Stephen Hawking’s question ‘did the universe have 
a beginning, and w hat is the nature of tim e?’ (cf Hawking 1988:1) thus has to be 
very carefully defined both scientifically and theologically. But in the same care-ful 
way we have to realize that the intent of, for instance, the G enesis passages is to 
underline the dependence of an intelligible and contingent universe on a C reator (cf 
Migliore 1991:95), and not necessarily to specify a first m om ent in time, at least in 
the technical sense of contem porary cosmology.
This example from the history of W estern thought alerts us to the epistem olo- 
gical fallacy of directly inferring from contemporary science to theological doctrine. 
It would be a serious category mistake to infer directly from, for example, the Big 
Bang to creation, from field theory to the Spirit of God, from chance to providence, 
from  entropy  to evil, o r from  the an throp ic  principle to  design. The Big Bang 
model, for instance, does not entitle us to infer - theologically or scientifically - an 
absolute beginning in tim e. On the o ther hand, th e re ’s nothing scientifically or 
philosophically inadmissible about the idea that an absolute beginning might have 
occurred. And if it did occur, it could look something like the horizon-event descri­
bed by the Big Bang theory. To describe this horizon-event as ‘the C reation’, how­
ever, is to explain it in terms of a cause that would not be scientific anymore.
What could a theologian then rightly infer from this highly successful theory? It 
would be possible to say, theologically, that if our universe had a beginning in time 
through the unique act of a creator, from our point of view it would look something 
like the Big Bang cosmologists are talking about. W hat one cannot say is that the 
doctrine of creation ‘supports’ the Big Bang model, or that the Big Bang ‘supports’ 
the Christian doctrine of creation (cf McMullin 1981:39). As Christians we should 
therefore take very seriously the theories of physics and biology: not to exploit or to 
try and change them , bu t to  try to find in te rp re ta tions tha t w ould suggest con-
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sonance with the C hristian viewpoint. Theology can, therefore, never claim to be 
capable of scientific theory appraisal, but should rather been seen as one elem ent in 
the constructing  o f a b ro ad er cu ltu ral world-view (cf M cM ullin 1981:51). The 
Christian can never separate her or his science from her or his theology, but he or 
he should also learn to distrust epistemological short-cuts from the one to the other. 
One way to do this would be to find a paradigm that would yield a fm e-tuned episte­
mological consonance.
Thus are revealed the philosophical and epistemological complexities involved 
in trying to relate theology and science today. In fact, I think that it is safe to say 
that until fairly recently, theological discussions, in particular, on the relationship 
betw een theo log ical and scientific epistem ology have been  notoriously  vague, 
im precise and even confused. Since the Enlightenm ent and the days of Immanuel 
Kant, right through to the thought of D F Strauss, Feuerbach, F reud and Marx, 
science was seen to be in conflict with religion, in fact as the great alternative to reli­
gion. This inevitably led, as is wellknown, to the stark opposition of a foundatio- 
nalist em piricist/positivist conception of science to an equally foundationalist con­
ception  o f b iblical literalism . This also reveals tha t genuine conflicts betw een 
science and theology are exceedingly difficult to detect, and specify accurately. In 
retrospect many of these serious clashes turn out to  be not betw een religion and 
science, but betw een incompatible, even incom m ensurable world-views or philoso­
phies (cfLash 1985:277).
T he cu rren t focus on the relationship  betw een theology and science - some 
prefer to talk of the emerging discipline of theology and science - suggests, however, 
a fall from epistem ological innocence regarding this complex and fascinating issue. 
For the philosophical theologian this presents a challenge to his o r her personal 
commitments and beliefs: a challenge that also implies a quest for a plausible model 
of theological contextuality, because it thrusts to the front questions about the status 
of religious claims to knowledge and about the rationality of belief in God.
C urrently, however, the relationship of theology and science is as vague and 
confusing as ever: some see them  as fundam entally in conflict with one another; 
others as independent of one another, others as in creative dialogue and consonance 
with one another, while still others thinkers wants to integrate theology and science 
in terms of either a theology of nature or some form of natural theology.
4. FO U N D A TIO N A U SM  IN TH EO LO G Y  AND SCIENCE
What we are certain about today, at least, is that in any contem porary evaluation of
the re la tionsh ip  betw een theology and science a foundationalist view of e ither
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science or theology would be epistemologically fatal. Foundationalism  holds that, in 
the process of justifying our knowledge-claims, the chain of justifying evidence can­
not go on ad infinitum if we are ever to be in a position to claim that we have justi­
fied our knowledge (cf S teuer 1987:237). Thus, foundationalists specify what they 
take to  be the u ltim ate  foundations on which the evidential support-system s for 
various beliefs are constructed. The sort of features most frequently m entioned are 
self-evidence, incorrigibility, being evident to the senses, indubitability and being 
self-authenticating and properly basic, i.e. foundational.
Foundationalism , as the thesis that our beliefs can be w arranted or justified by 
appealing to some item of knowledge that is self-evident or beyond doubt, certainly 
elim inates any possibility of discovering a meaningful epistemological link betw een 
theology and the other sciences. To claim that knowledge rests on foundations, is to 
claim  that there  is a privileged class of beliefs which is intrinsically credible and 
able, therefore , to serve as ultim ate term inating points for chains of justification. 
These ‘givens’ could be anything from sense data to universals, essences, experience, 
and G od’s revelation. In this sense the ‘doctrine of the given’ can indeed be called 
the com rade-in-arm s of all foundationahsm  (cf Frankenberry 1987:6). In the natu­
ral sciences, foundationalism implies a positivist empiricism or scientific materialism 
that per definition renders all religion, and certainly all theology and theological 
reflection, meaningless (cf B arbour 1990:4). In theology, foundationalism  implies 
biblical literalism or, on a much more sophisticated level, a self-authenticating ‘posi­
tivism of revelation’ that isolates theology because it denies the crucial role of inter­
preted  religious experience in all theological reflection: here the theologian is left 
speaking a language whose conceptuality might be internally coherent but which at 
the same time is powerless to communicate its content because it is unrelated to all 
non-theological discourse (cf G reen 1989:34).
Philosophers like Ludwig W ittgenstein, T hom as S Kuhn and  R ichard Rorty 
today represent a strong non-foundational response to traditional epistem ological 
questions. Instead of a model of knowledge as an entity resting on fixed and im mu­
table  foundations, they offer a  picture of hum an knowledge as an evolving social 
phenom enon within a web of beliefs. Belief systems are here discovered within a 
contextual matrix that is itself groundless. Justification becomes a m atter of accom­
m odating those beliefs tha t a re  being questioned , to  an o th e r body of accepted  
beliefs. W hatever theories we might have about anything that might be ‘given’ in 
religious or scientific experience, epistem ic justification will not have an unproble­
matic, uninterpreted ‘given’ at its foundation. With this in mind it not only becomes 
clear that in theology all forms of foundationalism and fideism go hand in hand, but
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also that non-foundationalism  will present a very special challenge to the Christian 
concept of revelation.
N either theology nor science, then, is based on incontrovertib le  grounds of 
knowledge. Each dem ands a com m itm ent to a corrigible point o f view and to the 
fact tha t an  elem ent o f the unexplained will always rem ain (cf Russell 1989:201). 
Both theology and science, fu rtherm ore, have to  speak of entities which a re  not 
directly observable and both must therefore be prepared to  use models and m eta­
phors as heuristic devices. This is also the context within which John Polkinghorne 
can state that mathem atics is the natural language of physical science, while symbol 
and m e tap h o r can be seen  as the n a tu ra l language for theology (Polkinghorne 
1991:2).
The epistemological move beyond foundationalism in science points to  the big­
gest revolution in physics since the days of Newton: the discovery of the elusive and 
fitful sub-atom ic world of quantum  theory. H ere our world has been proved to be 
strange beyond our powers of anticipation. If this is true for physics, it undoubtedly 
can be true  for theology as well. The quantum  world exhibits a counter-intuitive 
non-locality, a togetherness-inseparability which provides a powerful image of holis­
tic solidarity which may even be a suggestive consonant image for the field of theo­
logy. Q uantum  theory has indeed taught us to be open to  the totally unexpected, 
even to the initially apparently unintelligible (cf Polkinghorne 1991:3ff).
To re jec t foundationalism  in theology, however, is not to em brace  non- or 
anti-foundationalism  per se: in any case not a type of anti-foundationalism  which 
claims that one can engage in theological reflection without attention to the expla­
natory nature and epistem ic status of theological truth-claim s. In fact, it could be 
co n v inc ing ly  show n th a t  th e  w ho le  d e b a te  b e tw e e n  fo u n d a tio n a lism  and  
anti-foundationatism  is based on the false dichotomy of an outdated epistemological 
dilemm a (cf Bernstein 1983; also Clayton 1989:152). Moreover, a  post-foundationa- 
list shift to a fallibilist epistemology, which honestly embraces the role o f traditional 
experience, personal commitment, interpretation and the provisional nature of all of 
our knowledge claims, avoids the alleged necessity of opting for either foundatio'na- 
lism or anti-foundationalism.
Leaving behind the dichotomy that fram ed the older fa ith /reason  debate, now 
opens the way to a postm odern holist epistemology which may have a m ajor influ­
ence on theological methodology: it is no longer necessary to hold tha t the trad i­
tional project of theological prologomena is always ancillary to theology, functioning 
(as in fundam ental theology) as a foundation to be dealt with prior to theological 
reflection and then always assumed in what follows (cf Van Huyssteen 1989:xi). In a 
postfoundationalist theology the epistem ological link betw een theology and the
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Other sciences can be left open because the project of theological methodology and 
‘prologom ena’ now becomes part of theological reflection as such (i.e. as part of an 
ongoing interdisciplinary inquiry within the practice of theology itself).
5. T H E  SHAPING O F  RATIONALITY IN T H E O LO G Y  AND SCIENCE
W hat will be needed in this interdisciplinary theology-and-science discussion is a 
methodological approach that not only recognizes theology as an explanatory disci­
pline, but also takes seriously the epistemological problem  of the shaping of ratio­
nality in theology and science, the herm eneutical problem relating context and m ea­
ning, the explanatory role of religious experience and beliefs, and the fallibilist and 
provisional nature of both theological and scientific truth-claim s. To this end the 
discussion of the problem  of rationality in contem porary philosophy of science has 
recently m ore and m ore proved to be an im portant guide to theology, and perhaps 
the most fruitful theology-and-science link to date. This discussion not only opens 
up b ro ad er defin itions of rationality  and indicates the sort of criteria  needed to 
govern theological assertions: it also highlights the centrality  o f experiential and 
practical factors in rational explanation and therefore in rationality in general. For 
this reason the recovery of the herm eneutical dimension in the natural sciences, the 
social sciences, and in theology, focuses on a postempiricist conception of science in 
which science is understood as a historically dynamic process in which there are con­
flicting and competing paradigm theories, research programmes and research tradi­
tions (cf Bernstein 1983:171f.).
The problem  of the shaping of rationality in theology to a great extent centres 
on the possible role of explanatory justification in theological thought and will there­
fore eventually force us to address the difficult epistemological issues of degrees of 
truth and the objectivity - if any! - of our statements. Generally speaking, the nature 
of rationality consists of the intelligent pursuit of certain epistem ic values, of which 
intelligibility is the most im portant. Theology obviously shares the quest for intel­
ligibility with all o ther sciences, w hatever the differences or sim ilarities betw een 
theology and the o ther sciences might be.
Now, if rationality is a means to the goals of science (cf McMullin 1988:25) and 
as such primarily consists of pursuing intelligibility by making the most progressive 
theory choices (cf Laudan 1977:121ff), intelligibility itself can be seen as a quest for 
understanding a i the deepest possible level. In theology, as in the o ther sciences, 
this will be attained by inferring - through evaluation and argum ent - to the best pos­
sible explanations. R ationality is thus prim arily shaped by the quest for intelligi­
bility, and in theology this intelligibility is attained through the explanatory role of
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religious experience and beliefs in our theological reflection. In both theology and 
in science we therefore  should bew are of an overly narrow  and rationalistic con­
ception of rationality. Rationality as such is complex, many-sided, extensive and as 
wide-ranging as the domain of intelligence itself.
Following the lead  of N icholas R escher (1988) we can now identify at least 
three contexts of rationality that are highly relevant not only for theology, but also 
for the social, human and natural sciences: the cognitive context, the evaluative con­
text, and the pragm atic context. What this means for theological reflection is, that in 
theology as well we have good reasons for hanging on to certain beliefs, good rea­
sons for making certain  moral choices, and good reasons for acting in certain ways. 
W ithin a holist epistemology these three contexts go together as a seam less whole 
and also can be regarded as the th ree  resources for rationality  in theology: they 
m erge in the com m on task of uniting the best reasons for belief, evaluation and 
action. We therefore act rationally in m atters of belief, action and evaluation when 
our reasons ‘hang together’, (i.e. are cogent). In theology, rationality implies the 
capacity to ‘give account’, to provide a rationale for the way one thinks, chooses, acts 
and believes. Theory-acceptance, then, has an epistem ic dimension. W hen we ask, 
however, what else other than belief is involved in theory-acceptance, the pragmatic 
and evaluative dim ensions of theory-acceptance are  revealed  (cf V an F raassen  
1989:3ff).
In both theology and science, rationality therefore pivots on the deploym ent of 
good reasons: believing, doing, choosing the right thing for the right reasons. Being 
rational is therefore not just a m atter of having some reasons for what one believes 
in and argues for, but having the best or strongest reasons to support the rationality 
of one’s beliefs within a concrete context. Rationality in theology and science, as we 
saw ea rlie r , is shaped prim arily by the quest for intelligibility. A nd this u nder­
standing at the deepest possible level is atta ined  by inferring to  the best possible 
explanations. In this sense rationality and explanation go together very closely.
The hazy in tersec tion  betw een the diverse fields of theology and the o ther 
sciences is therefore not in the first place to be determ ined by exploring m ethodo­
logical parallels or degrees of consonance between theology and the sciences. What 
should be explored first is the epistem ological question of the nature and status of 
explanations and explanatory claims in theology and the other sciences, since theo­
logical doctrines and constructs, as well as scientific theories aim at giving the best 
possible explanations in their respective fields. In this reflection we should be wary 
o f dangerous epistem ological short-cuts: rationality  should never be reduced to 
scientific rationality, and scientific rationality should never be reduced to natural 
scientific rationality.
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6. EXPLANATIONS IN T H E O LO G Y  AND SCIENCE
In theological explanations religious beliefs play a central role. Religious beliefs of 
course have im portant functions for the believer. They describe the rites and practi­
ces o f believing com m unities, express in the language of faith  psychological and 
sociological needs, and also answer philosophical questions in religious term s. In 
short, religious beliefs help to explain the world and the place of believers in it. In 
doing this, religious beliefs reflect a general sense of meaningfulness on the part of 
the believer; a m eaningfulness tha t extends from an existential level to  the level of 
particu lar theo ries and dogm as (cf C layton 1989:lf). But o f central im portance 
among the various functions of religious beliefs is that o f explanation.
The question that now arises is w hether there is a unitary theory of explanation 
that would allow us to speak of explanation in the singular when referring to the 
b ro ad er spectrum  of academ ic disciplines. Eventually it will becom e clear that 
there are im portant parallels betw een explanation in the sciences and in theology. 
However significant these parallels might be, religious and theological explanations 
do have unique aspects as well: they are normally all-encompassing and deeply per­
sonal, they often arise from vague and elusive questions concerning the meaning of 
life, and as religious answers they provide ultim ate meaning in life. Religious - and 
eventually theological explanations - thus provide a context of security for the belie­
ver and also involve a faith-com m itm ent to God. This implies that both the scope 
and content o f theological explanations may set them  apart from  explanations in 
other areas. In assessing the explanatory role of religious experience and beliefs we 
therefore should assess the continuities as well as the discontinuities between theo­
logical and other types of explanations. Scientific explanations, of course, are never 
com pletely im personal, but they are  capable of achieving a high degree of in ter­
personal agreem ent. A rt and ethics are  much more personal than science and as 
such may not rep resen t a reas in which universal agreem ent is a tta inab le . Even 
m ore personal is the realm  of religious experience, where also the refracting influ­
ence of culture is powerfully present (cf Polkinghorne 1991:54).
The central goal of natural scientific theories is to explain the empirical world. 
To call an explanation ‘scientific’, is to say that the explanation draws on science for 
its information, and that the criteria of evaluation o f how good an explanation it is, 
are being applied, using a scientific theory (cf Van Fraassen 1989:156). Theories of 
explanation, however, have been directly influenced by im portant shifts in the pro­
b lem  of na tu ra l scien tific  ra tionality , especially  since the advent o f T hom as S. 
Kuhn’s revolutionary paradigm theory (cf Van Huyssteen 1989:47-70). This contex- 
tualist shift in the philosophy of the natural sciences clearly indicates that a very 
specific herm eneutical awareness, as well as the realization that criteria for explana­
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tion function only within a particular paradigm. Seen in the light of this contextua- 
list shift, explanations in science are relativized and becom e an elem ent within the 
broader herm eneutical task of science (cf Clayton 1989:39).
In the social and hum an sciences a long and learned  trad ition  has opposed 
explanation to em phatic understanding. E xplanation in the social sciences, how­
ever, does not need to  be down-played in the light o f the b roader herm eneutical 
purpose of the social and hum an sciences. It also would be incorrect to  claim that, 
because of their subject m atter, the social and hum an sciences are m ore subjective 
than the natural sciences: the role of subjective factors in the formulation of natural 
as well as social scientific explanations is today widely accepted. Eventually we shall 
see that not only in theology, but also in the social, human and natural sciences, the 
subjectivity of in terpre ting  belongs right in the heart of the explanatory task. On 
another level the explanatory task in the social sciences is closer to explanations in 
theology than to explanations in the natural sciences. Both in the social and human 
sciences and in theology the object o f research is itself already symbolically struc­
tured, mainly as a result of a long and ongoing history of interpretation. Therefore, 
if all science then is hermeneutical, in the human and social sciences, and especially 
in the history of theological ideas, we encounter what some scholars have called a 
‘double herm eneutic’ of having to interpret again the already pre-in terpreted  world 
of our experience (cf Clayton 1989:88).
From  this we may conclude that explanation - w hether in the natural, social or 
hum an sciences or in theology - is always a form  of ra tional reconstruction , that 
rational thought is never purely objective, that context greatly influences the inter­
pretive theoretical process, and that any research program and its explanations can 
only be partially evaluated at any given tim e. And in ou r quest for intelligibility, 
coherence - although a necessary criterion for rational thought - can by itself never 
be a sufficient condition for the stories in which we articulate our hope and symboli­
cally unify our fragmented experience (cf Lash 1985:277).
O ur quest for some form of epistem ological consonance between theology and 
science thus brings us to philosophical explanations. Philosophical explanations, 
like o ther explanations, aim to address and coherently answer som e specific ques­
tion. They are philosophical in that they are not limited in scope to any particular 
discipline, or aspect of experience (cf Clayton 1989:104). In trying to understand the 
explanatory role of religious experiences and the beliefs that constitute them , it is 
im portant to note that religious explanations share some very significant features 
with philosophical explanations. The m ost im portan t o f these a re  their g reater 
generality or depth and an emphasis on systematic coherence and meaningfulness.
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For philosophical and religious (and eventually also theological) explanations, 
both the context principle of rationality and the coherence theory of meaning are of 
prime im portance: from the perspective of a  coherence theory of meaning, a philo­
sophical or a religious explanation is not all that different from other explanations. 
W hen therefore we reflect on a  portion of our experience, it is possible to  put this 
reflection  on a  p rob lem  within an  ever-broadening horizon of contexts until we 
reach a context tha t reaches out to  the whole of hum an experience. At this level 
one is involved in making sense of total experience, and this broadest context could 
be labelled metaphysical or religious. Within this broader context of religious expe­
rience, Philip Clayton (1989:5, 113ff) has recently identified at least three types or 
forms of explanation:
• Private explanations: these explanations are  w arran ted  solely by the fact that 
they make sense of experience for the individual believer. Private explanations 
can be quite comprehensive in scope and can account for broad areas of human 
experience, but the justification of these explanations is rooted in personal value 
alone.
* Comm unal explanations: here the standards of adequate explanations are set by 
the particular believing and practising community.
’ [ntersubjective or transcommunal explanations: this category of explanation sup­
poses that religious beliefs can be justified in a way that transcends the bounda­
ries of the individual religious community. W ithin the C hristian  comm unity 
apologetics and natural theology fit this notion of transcom m unal justification. 
Christian beliefs are held as a rational and best-available explanation that the 
believer takes to have more than merely communal validity.
T he im portance of these d istinctions for theology is ap p aren t: any com parison 
between theology and science would be meaningful only if a form of transcommunal 
explanation is at least one viable form of epistem ic justification in theological ref­
lection.
As far as theological explanations go, theologians should first and forem ost 
beware of the fideist miscontrual where faith is seen as evidence for the truth of reli­
gious or theological propositions. Faith - as the ‘heart’ of religion - implies a total 
comm itment to the object of one’s belief. In the context of rational argum entation, 
however, faith does not make the object of faith more probable and thus should be 
seen neither ás an epistem ic virtue nor, of course, as an epistem ic vice (cf Clayton 
1989:143). It now becomes clear that the believer’s efforts to understand and come 
to terms with her or his faith display a structure quite similar to scientific rationality. 
Seen against this background theological explanations a ttem pt to  establish a  link
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betw een the inherited beliefs and practices of a specific religious tradition and the 
contem porary experience of its adheren ts (cf Van Huyssteen 1989:200ff). These 
explanations arise out of trad itional experience and can be phrased  in term s of 
traditional doctrines, the practices (liturgies and rites) of a religious community, and 
its norms or codes of behaviour, or they can be constructed in term s of the broader 
intellectual, social and ethical intersubjective life-experience of believers.
As such theological explanations function to continually ensure a  trad ition ’s 
relevance to  the challenges posed by contem porary contextual questions. Clayton 
(1989:149) is therefore right when he states that theology is not primarily a descrip­
tive (first-order) but an explanatory (second-order) endeavour. T here are indeed 
good reasons for theology to pursue explanatory adequacy and academ ic excellence. 
All theological explanations should therefore be open to intersubjective exam ina­
tion and criticism, which means that theological statem ents should at all tim es be 
construed as hypotheses (cf Van Huyssteen 1989:143ff). And since all attem pts to 
clarify C hristian  beliefs necessarily involve dependence on categories not drawn 
from  the C hristian tradition, as well as use of general notions such as truth, m ea­
ning, coherence and reference, Christian theology will always find itself in necessary 
discourse with other theologies, and with the science and philosophy of its times.
In conclusion I would therefore like to claim that the quest for intelligibility and 
explanatory progress in theology is also dependent on the evolving nature  of the 
epistem ic values that have shaped theological rationality in history. This implies 
that the realist assum ptions and com m itm ents o f experienced C hristian faith  are 
relevant epistemological issues to be dealt with seriously in the theology and science 
discussion. By doing this, theology could move away from the absolutism of founda- 
tionalism as well as from the relativism of anti-foundationalism. This can further be 
achieved by showing that because theology is an activity of a community o f inqui­
rers, there can be no way to prescribe a rationality for that activity w ithout consi­
dering its actual practice.
The theology-and-science discussion in a very specific way reveals how the 
exp lanatory  ro le  o f in te rp re ted  experience in theology can only be adequately  
explained in term s of an experiential epistemology. This m eans not only that reli­
gious experience is b e tte r explained theologically, bu t also that, in explaining the 
role of experience, the philosophical theologian will have to move from the question 
of rationality to intelligibility, from intelligibility to the question of personal under­
standing, and from personal understanding to personal experience. This is som e­
thing the scientist need never do. D ealing with personal com m itm ent in this way 
may show that the rationality of theology is often shaped by epistem ic values diffe­
rent from those of science. The dependence of theology on experiential adequacy
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for de term in ing  and m aintain ing  its explanatory adequacy need, however, never 
again mean that theology is less rational or less contextual than science.
The nature of the ongoing discussion between theology and science should help 
us to realize that, in spite o f a promising and emerging new field of study, the com­
plex relationship betw een scientific and religious epistemology is m ore challenging 
than  ever. T his becom es all the m ore clear when we keep in mind not only the 
deco n stru c tio n  and  discovery o f the lim ita tions of th e  na tu ra l sciences in the 
post-K uhnian era , bu t also when we focus carefully on the natu re  o f the natural 
sciences. The sciences are eminently com petent when it comes to theory-construc- 
tion and to experimental and pragm atic enterprises, but they are incom petent when 
it comes to finding answers to our deepest religious questions.
The fundam ental differences between theology and science should therefore be 
respected, as well as the difference between different forms of explanations not only 
in the different sciences, but also betw een theology and the o ther sciences. How­
ever, in spite of im portant differences and som etim es radically different levels of 
explanation, theology and science do share a common ground of rationality. A theo­
logy and a science that come to discover this mutual quest for intelligibility, in spite 
of im portant differences will also be free to discover that nothing that is part of, or 
the result of, natural scientific explanation, need ever be logically incompatible with 
theological reflection. S tephen H awking’s (1988;140f) disturbing question ‘what 
place would there be for a  creator in a universe without a beginning in tim e?’ could 
then be answ ered as follows: in principle, every possible place; a ‘place’ that might 
even sha tte r all our conventional (and unconventional) m odels for depicting the 
transcendence and im m anence of God. W hether the universe had a beginning in 
time or not does not affect our reading of the G enesis story in its depiction of the 
com plete dependence of the universe on G od. G od is not a G od of the gaps, or a 
G od of the edges (cf Polkinghorne 1991:81) but is the Christian theologian’s answer 
as to why th ere  is som ething ra th e r than  nothing. Science can tell us little  or 
nothing about our experience of subjectivity, about the astonishing em ergence of 
personhood, and about why we have an intelligible universe. G od is the name that 
we give to the best available explanation of all that is (cf Peacocke 1990:134).
In focusing on the im portance of the natural sciences, we should then have an 
openness for that which reaches beyond the world of the natural sciences (i.e. to the 
world on which the social sciences, history, philosophy and theology focus). In this 
w ider context, we could discover tha t theology and science both share not only a 
mutually enriching quest for intelligibility, but also the im portance of tradition and 
the explanatory role of in terpreted  experience. An honest analysis of the differen­
ces between the sciences, and between theological and scientific explanations, might
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then just yield m ore intelligibility in the apologetic attem pt to understand our post­
m odern world as truly G od’s own world.
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